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THESE PARKS ARE OUR PARKS: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC 
PARKS IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE’S PROTECTIONS 
 
Thomas Honan* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Great GoogaMooga, advertised as “an amusement park of Food, 
Drink, & Music” was a music, artisan food, and drink festival in Prospect 
Park.1 GoogaMooga lasted two days during the summer of 2012 and three 
days during the summer 2013,2 and demonstrates the negative impact of 
private use on public space.3 The Prospect Park Alliance, a non-profit 
organization founded to raise private funds to supplement the financing of 
Prospect Park,4 and Superfly, a privately owned music festival company, 
organized GoogaMooga.5 The festival was strategically placed in 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015, City University of New York School of Law.  
1 About Great Googamooga, http://brooklyn.googamooga.com/(last visited Apr. 26, 
2014). 
2 Florence Fabricant, The GoogaMooga Festival Will Return in May, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2013, http://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/the-googamooga-festival-
will-return-in-may/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
3 Lauren Evens, Photos: After GoogaMoogApocalypse, A Scorched Earth That Will 
Take Months To Recover, THE GOTHAMIST (May 22, 2013), 
http://gothamist.com/2013/05/22/great_googa_mooga.php#photo-1. 
4 The Prospect Park Alliance is an organization that partners with the City of New 
York for managing and maintaining the park. What We Do, THE PROSPECT PARK 
ALLIANCE, http://www.prospectpark.org/learn-more/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015). 
5 Michael Powell, A Curious Cost/Benefit Analysis of a Park Fund-Raiser, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 17, 2013), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/a-curious-costbenefit-
analysis-of-a-park-fund-raiser/. 
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Nethermead Meadow, a lovely tree-lined meadow located in the center of 
the park.6 Nethermead Meadow is traditionally used by the public for dog 
walking, tossing a football, and gathering with friends for a picnic, the 
leisure activities one would expect to take place in a park meadow. Over the 
three-day event, Nethermead Meadows played host to approximately 
120,000 people, and accommodated approximately 75 restaurant stands, 65 
drink stations, and two stages where 20 bands performed.7 As one Prospect 
Park local aptly put it, “It’s like bringing a boombox into a library – it 
doesn’t belong there.”8 
The festival was intended as a fund-raising opportunity for the park.9 
The idea was that the event would raise sufficient funds to provide a benefit 
to all the park users.10 Instead, the festival resulted in the destruction of the 
Nethermead Meadow and prevented the public from its use for a month 
after it ended.11 Additionally, the festival was promoted as a community 
event.12 The Great GoogaMooga website explains: “And that’s why The 
Great GoogaMooga is more than a festival. It’s a community brought 
together by a shared passion.”13 However, many of the communities 
surrounding the park were unable to attend because of the high admission 
cost of $79.50,14 and the Nethermead Meadow prevented non-ticket holders 
from access by way of a fence.15 The most disturbing aspect of The Great 
GoogaMooga experience is that in consideration for allowing the park’s 
use, The Prospect Park Alliance received a mere $75,000.16 Essentially, the 
                                                
6Neathermead Meadow, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140404034922/http://www.prospectpark.org/nethermead 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
7 Jess Wisloski, The Great GoogaMooga, a Bonnaroo For Brooklyn Foodies, Reveals 
Lineup, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/24/the-great-googamooga-a-bonnaroo-brooklyn-
lineup-music_n_1450543.html. 
8 Powell, supra note 6. 
9 Why the Great GoogaMooga, Prospect Park Alliance, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140310224724/http://www.prospectpark.org/about/communit
y-news-updates-post/why-the-great-googamooga?lpid=1538183 (last visited Apr. 25, 
2014). 
10 Id. 
11 Powell, supra note 6. 
12About Great Googamooga, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131019205106/http://brooklyn.googamooga.com/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
13 Id. 
14Rachel Tepper, GoogaMooga 2013: Festival Wises Up, Promises To Fix First-Year 
Mess, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2013, 9:15 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/26/googamooga-2013_n_2958510.html.  
15 Powell, supra note 6. 
16 Id. 
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festival was intended to provide a substantial benefit to the public and 
promoted itself as a community event, when in reality the surrounding 
community lost part of its park for a month. 
The GoogaMooga experience illustrates the effects privatization can 
have on the public’s use of its parks. Public parks are areas of land that are 
dedicated to be used for the public interest.17 Since the 1970s, there has 
been a steady trend toward the privatization of public parks in New York 
City.18 Over the past ten years, new models of privatization have emerged, 
and, more than ever, the public is in danger of losing out on its use of 
parks.19 This trend corresponds with a substantial decrease in state and city 
funding for public parks.20 Since 2008, the City has slashed its overall 
maintenance and operation of parks budget by 21%.21 
Accompanying the decrease of state and city financing, the 
beautification and expansion of the number of public parks in New York 
City have increased.22 Under Mayors Rudy Giuliani and Michael 
Bloomberg, three new parks were created (High Line, Brooklyn Bridge 
Park, and The Hudson River Park).23 The decrease in state and city 
financing coupled with an increase in public parkland have forced parks to 
seek out new structures of operating, managing, and financing, which often 
result in development or promotional use of parkland in a way that excludes 
or limits the public’s access.24 Additionally, the mechanisms in which these 
                                                
17 795 Fifth Ave Corp v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 183 (Sup. Ct. NY Cnty. 
1963). 
18 See TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS 
GLOBAL REAL ESTATE 75-78 (The MIT Press 2011) (describing the NYC fiscal crisis of 
the 1970s, and the divestment in public resources including public space). See John L. 
Crompton, Programs that Work: Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in 
Parks and Recreation, 16 J. PARK AND RECREATION ADMIN. 88, 90 (1998) (discussing the 
emergence of alternative models of managing parks). 
19 Michael F. Murray, Private Management of Public Spaces: Nonprofit Organizations 
and Urban Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 190 (2010); Douglas Martin, Clown 
Prince of the Emerald Empire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/19/nyregion/clown-prince-of-the-emerald-empire.html 
(discussing Henry J. Stern and his reliance on free labor and private money for park 
maintenance). 
20 Christopher Rizzo, Five Innovative Ideas for Funding Parks and Open Space, 13 
N.Y. ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE REPORT 1, 2 (Jul.-Aug. 2012). 
21 Id. 
22 Id.; See Frank Bruni, Our Newly Lush Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 14, 2012) (discussing 
parkland expansion under the Bloomberg Administration); Martin, supra note 20 
(discussing parkland expansion under the Giuliani Administration). 
23 Rizzo, supra note 21 at 3. 
24 See Cathryn Swan, Pushing Privatized “Partnership” agenda at New York City’s 
Public Parks –Part 3, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cathryn-swan/pushing-privatized-partnership-
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structures are forming eliminate the parks’ accountability to the public.25 
Historically, the common law public trust doctrine in New York 
provided protections for the public’s interest in its parks.26 It limited 
development through public officials’ accountability to state residents,27 and 
sought to maintain parkland for the purpose of public use and enjoyment of 
traditional park purposes.28 The primary principle of the public trust 
doctrine is that the state of New York holds the park in trust while the city 
manages and maintains it for the public interest.29 To put this differently, 
the state and city are responsible for assuring that parks remain adequately 
maintained and are managed to remain accessible to its citizens.30 If the city 
of New York wishes to sell, lease, or use public parkland for “non-park” 
purposes, it is required to receive legislative approval.31 The development 
of New York’s public trust doctrine has concentrated on distinguishing park 
purposes from non-park purposes, allowing park purposes to evade 
legislative approval.32 
The public trust doctrine lacks proper definitions, is antiquated, and 
does not adequately address the current issues facing public park use and 
development today.33 The creation of new privatized structures to operate 
public parks and subvert the public trust doctrine, result in greater use of 
                                                                                                                       
agenda_b_3769191.html. 
25 Id. 
26 795 Fifth Ave. Corp., supra note 20; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1969) 
(discussing three restrictions on governmental authority imposed by the public trust 
doctrine including the holding of the property by the government for the public purpose 
and for use by the general public; see Brooklyn Parks Com’rs v. Armstrong, 6 Hand 234, 
244 (1871). 
27 Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920) (“…no objects, however 
worthy…which have no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach 
upon it without legislative authority plainly conferred…”); Cyane Gresham, Improving 
Public Trust Protections on Municipal Parkland in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 
259, 284-86 (2002) (discussing the local community’s ability to prevent legislation if 
legislative approval is required). 
28 Williams, 229 N.Y. 248 at 253; Cyane Gresham, Improving Public Trust Protections 
on Municipal Parkland in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 284-86 (2002). 
29 SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 124059/01, 2002 Sup. Ct. WL 
1363372, at *8 (N.Y. Cnty. 2002); Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 95 
N.Y.2d 623 (“dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust for the 
benefit of the people of the State. Their ‘use for other than park purposes, either for a 
period of years or permanently, requires the direct and specific approval of the State 
Legislature, plainly conferred.”). 
30 See SFX Entertainment, Inc., 2002 WL 1363372 at *8. 
31 Id. 
32 See Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248 (1920). 
33 Cyane Gresham, Improving Public Trust Protections on Municipal Parkland in New 
York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 276-77, 282-83 (2002). 
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park space for private, corporate interests, and limits the accessibility of the 
general public. Courts need to account for the recent neo-liberal adaptations 
through expansion of the doctrine’s protections,34 and the city’s residents 
need more responsibility in the decision making process of park 
development.35 
This Comment advocates for two major changes. First, it argues that 
courts need to more heavily consider the public’s access to public parkland, 
in the face of major development, which excludes a large portion of the 
public from the use and enjoyment of parkland, in its analysis of what is a 
park/non-park purpose. Second, the approval of park purpose developments 
on parkland should give the affected community more responsibility in the 
decision-making process.36 It will include two case studies to examine the 
trend toward the evisceration of the public trust doctrine, and the failure of 
private-public partnerships to develop parkland. These case studies will 
look at the role the municipality plays in the formation and operation of the 
degree to which they are accountable to the public, how their exclusivity 
prevents access to much of the public, and to what extent they are limited 
[or not] by the public trust doctrine. 
This Comment will begin in section I with a discussion of the 
transformation in financing of public parks in New York City, from 
publicly financed to reliance on private and corporate support to maintain 
its public parks. Section II examines The Brooklyn Bridge Park (“BBP”) 
and The Hudson River Park (“HRP”) as case studies, illustrative of how the 
new managing and financing structures subvert the public trust doctrine and 
the failures of private-public partnerships in their management of public 
                                                
34 This Comment defines neo-liberalism as a political and economic paradigm that 
seeks to combine political freedom with the concept of free market capitalism and the 
privatization of the public domain. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
2 (Oxford University Press 2005) (“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”). 
35 Cathryn Swan, Union Square FOR Sale?… Judge rules NYC Parks Department and 
local BID can Proceed with Renovation that Will Likely Include Privatized Restaurant, 
WASHINGTON SQUARE PARK BLOG (Apr. 2 2009), 
http://washingtonsquareparkblog.com/2009/04/01/union-square-for-sale-judge-rules-in-
favor-of-nyc-saying-historic-public-space-can-be-privatized/. 
36 The concept of relying more heavily on the municipal citizenry to participate in 
decision-making stems from the broader idea of “deliberative democracy.” Deliberative 
democracy is a participatory governance model that promotes the removal of decision 
making from the politicians and placed in the “public sphere.” This theory suggests that 
deliberative decision-making will ensure government is run by the public standards. 
Patricia E. Salkin and Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the 
Grassroots: The Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 756-58 (Mar. 2012). 
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parks. Section III returns to the common law public trust doctrine, 
examining the original purposes behind its formation, its current status, and 
how it falls short of that protective purpose vis-à-vis the rise of newly 
privatized public parks. Section IV will suggest proposals for the courts’ 
future analysis of park/non-park purposes. Section V will discuss the 
connection between this analysis and the disparity of maintenance of parks 
in wealthy and low-income neighborhoods as a conclusion. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
“In Real Estate 101, we learn that the three universal principles of real estate for 
people who own property are location, location, location.” 
– Tom Angotti 
 
In New York City, land is scarce and valuable. Alone, the land on 
Manhattan is worth billions, and the metropolitan region, trillions.37 While 
land value is based on many different interplaying factors, one major 
determinant of valued land is whether it is next to a park, on a waterway, or 
even better, both.38 For example, Central Park adds an estimated $17.7 
billion in value to its surrounding buildings.39 Additionally, a 2002 survey 
by Ernst and Young indicates an 8%-30% increase in property value near a 
park.40 For example, the Highline, a private/public venture and relatively 
new park that is built atop an abandoned elevated railway, has helped to 
promote some of the most rapid gentrification in the City’s recent history.41 
The Highline has been attributed to increasing the property values in the 
neighborhood by 103 percent.42 
New York City urban planning is heavily influenced by the real estate 
industry.43 Therefore, there is a major financial incentive for New York City 
to expand its park space.44 Since 2002, three major parks have opened: the 
                                                
37 Angotti, supra note 19, at 38. 
38 Felix Simon, Why Privately-Financed Public Parks are a Bad Idea, REUTERS (Nov. 
22, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/11/21/why-privately-financed-
public-parks-are-a-bad-idea/. 
39 Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2. 
40 Id. at 1-2; see New Yorkers for Parks & Ernst & Young, How Smart Parks 
Investment Pays its Way, 1 (2003). 
41 Jeremiah Moss, Disney World on the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/opinion/in-the-shadows-of-the-high-line.html. 
42 New York City Economic Development Corporation, Economic Snapshot: a 
Summary of New York City’s Economy (Aug. 2011), available at 
https://www.nycedc.com/sites/default/files/files/economic-
snapshot/EconomicSnapshotAugust2011_0.pdf. 
43 Angotti, supra note 19, at 46. 
44 Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2. 
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High Line, Brooklyn Bridge Park, and The Hudson River Park.45 In contrast 
to this expansion of public park space, New York City underwent a major 
divestment in its parks department and public parkland.46 Now, it relies 
more and more on quasi public-private structures to maintain its parkland.47 
This divestment did not happen overnight, and is part of a much larger 
trend in New York City of substituting the use of public monies for public 
spaces with a reliance on private entrepreneurship and philanthropic 
donations to support its public spaces.48 The 1970s marked New York 
City’s fiscal crisis,49 the closest New York City has come to bankruptcy. 
New York City’s bankruptcy could have had far reaching repercussions for 
urban municipalities across the Northeast.50  While the Federal Government 
under Gerald Ford essentially told New York to “drop dead,”51 the state 
eventually prevented the world’s largest city from declaring bankruptcy.52 
The typical discussions at the time simplified the complex causes of the 
fiscal crisis, and were generally framed within the rhetoric of too much 
short-term borrowing and debt load, loss of revenues, and the inability of 
New York City to manage its budget.53 By simplifying the causes, the 
response was also simplistic; New York City must slash expenditures, 
contract out government responsibilities to the private sector that could 
more efficiently and responsibly manage its budget, and rely on 
development and entrepreneurship to replace municipal expenditure cuts.54 
Essentially, the fiscal crisis resulted in a lack of trust in the city to manage 
its finances, which has continued until today.55 
In the wake of the fiscal crisis and the shift from New Deal toward neo-
liberal politics, a major divestment in city resources took place.56 Arguably, 
                                                
45 Id. at 3. 
46 Id. 
47 See Swan, supra note 25. 
48 See Angotti, supra note 19, at 77 (discussing the dramatic effect of divestment from 
city resources on public parks and open space, and the private models that have filled the 
financing gap); Murray, supra note 20, at 190. 
49 See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN 
FISCAL CRISIS 1 (1982). 
50 Id. (explaining that the fall of New York City could have been the beginning of the 
fall of the urban cities all across the northeast). 
51 Angotti, supra note 19, at 76. 
52 Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the 
Grassroots: The Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 731 (2012) (discussing the fiscal crisis of 1970 and its results on 
the federal, state, and municipal governance roles). 
53 Tabb, supra note 50, at 2-3 (discussing the ways that the fiscal crisis was viewed by 
many within both the federal and state governments). 
54 Id. 
55 Angotti, supra note 19, at 77. 
56 Id. at 12, 76 (discussing the deregulation and support structures of the federal 
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the most drastic cuts were from the Parks Department and management of 
public spaces.57 Public spaces are an easy target for municipal cuts, because 
the Parks Department receives little support from the state and federal 
government and is therefore easy to cut from the city’s discretionary 
budgets.58 Since the 1990s, the Parks Department’s full time employees 
were cut by 50%, and its overall budget by 11%.59 Between 2008 and 2013, 
New York City further cut its maintenance and operation budgets by 21%.60 
Even more noteworthy, is that although New York City’s parks and 
playgrounds occupy 14% of the city’s land, the 2010 budget allocated a 
mere .5% of its annual budget for parks.61 
Coupled with this major divestment of municipal funds from public 
spaces has been a movement toward creating quasi private-public 
arrangements for the maintenance and operation of public parks.62 The first 
of these structures was The Central Park Conservancy, created in 1980.63 
Upon its creation, The Conservancy immediately stepped in and raised 
approximately $180 million for capital projects and restoration of the 
park.64 There are certainly issues with the Conservancy model, because 
much of that $180 million is tax deductible and therefore the government 
still fronts much of the bill.65 
Since the establishment of the Central Park Conservancy, public parks 
in New York City have followed suit. The Prospect Park Alliance was 
established in 1987,66 and The Battery Park Conservancy in 1994.67 As this 
                                                                                                                       
government beginning in the 1970’s, and the way these policies “diluted” the role of social 
movements in American cities). 
57 See John L. Crompton, Forces Underlying the Emergence of Privatization in Parks 
and Recreation, 16 J. OF PARK AND RECREATION 88, 90 (discussing the emergence of new 
privatized models of services after the 1970s). 
58 Id. at 174. 
59 Anemona Hartocollis, Parks in a Tangle, a Plan to Tame, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 
2005), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/08/nyregion/thecity/08colm.html?pagewanted=print&_r
=0. 
60 Rizzo, supra note 21, at 2. 
61 New Yorkers for Parks, Supporting Our Parks: A Guide to Alternative Revenue 
Strategies, 3 (2006) available at http://www.ny4p.org/research/other-reports/or-
altrevenue10.pdf. 
62 Angotti, supra note 19, at 77. 
63 Interview by Amy Eddings with Karen Putnam, President, Central Park 
Conservancy (Feb. 20, 1998), available at 
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=98-P13-00008&segmentID=1. 
64 Id. 
65 See Felix Simon, The Problematic Charitable-Donation Tax Deduction, REUTERS 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/11/28/the-problematic-
charitable-donation-tax-deduction/. 
66 The Alliance, THE PROSPECT PARK ALLIANCE, http://www.prospectpark.org/learn-
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shift toward privatization evolves, parks seek out models that will allow for 
more development in order to raise funds, and fewer limitations on the 
decision to develop the parks, which by its nature means side-stepping the 
Public Trust Doctrine.68 
 
II. CASE STUDIES, THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE PARK AND THE HUDSON 
RIVER PARK: THE SUBVERSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
AND THE FAILURES OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE PRIVATE/PUBLIC 
MODELS 
 
Reserving public parks for the availability and use of the general public 
is a major principle underlying the public trust doctrine. In New York a 
public park cannot be alienated or used for a non-park purpose without the 
approval of the legislature and a “home rule” request.69 The following 
section develops case studies of two NYC parks to demonstrate the effects 
of commercial use on parks, including the lack of accountability to the 
public, the exclusion of certain vulnerable populations from any calculus in 
the parks decisions to develop, how private/public partnerships are failing, 
and how these new structures are able to avoid the public trust doctrine’s 
limitations. 
 
A.   The Brooklyn Bridge Park 
 
This first section considers how a properly dedicated park can 
circumvent the public trust doctrine and its protections. The Brooklyn 
Bridge Park is an example of the shift toward privatization of public park 
space and the control that private entities have over the parkland.70 
The history of the Brooklyn Bridge Park is unique and provides insight 
into the intentions behind the creation of the park. In the 1980s the Port 
Authority wanted to sell its abandoned piers to private developers for the 
creation of luxury apartment buildings.71 The result would have meant a 
                                                                                                                       
more/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
67 About the Battery Conservancy, THE BATTERY CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.thebattery.org/the-conservancy/ (last visited May. 7, 2014). 
68 Rizzo, supra note 21. 
69 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 40; Uniform Land Use Review Procedure § 2-01; 
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
68, MICH. L. REV. 471, 476-78 (1969) (discussing restrictions on state authority). 
70 Alex Ulam, Our Parks Are Not for Sale: From the Gold Coast of New York to the 
Venice Biennale, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Winter 2013, available at 
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/our-parks-are-not-for-sale-from-the-gold-coast-of-
new-york-to-the-venice-biennale. 
71 Angotti, supra note 19, at 174. 
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blocked waterfront view for the rest of Brooklyn.72 The Brooklyn Heights 
Association and a number of affected community groups, neighborhood 
associations, and civic groups rallied in opposition to this sale.73 The 
proposal was defeated, and followed by a long process of creating a park, 
accessible to all, on the property.74 
The Brooklyn Bridge Park Coalition (“the Coalition”) engaged in a ten-
plus year process to formulate a plan for the Brooklyn Bridge Park.75 In 
1992, the Coalition issued a statement of “13 guiding principles” for the 
future development of a plan,76 and subsequently began planning to 
implement the project.77 In 1998 the Downtown Waterfront Local 
Development Corporation (“DWLDC”) was created for the purpose of 
planning the park.78 The result of the DWLDC, public forums, and 
thousands of affected community members’ input was the issuance of the 
“Illustrative Master Plan”,79 and the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”) between the Governor and the Mayor (“the 
Parties”).80 The MOU lays out the parties’ intentions for the creation of the 
Brooklyn Bridge Park, and reads in pertinent part: 
 
1. The State of New York and the City of New York share a 
common determination to preserve and provide public access to 
waterfront areas in order to allow for recreation and public 
enjoyment and to enhance economic development 
 
2. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has agreed to 
transfer parcels of real property for dedication to the Project, 
including Piers 1-5 adjacent to the East River on Brooklyn 
Waterfront for purposes of creating a public park. 
 
3. The Parties agree that the Project will be guided by the provisions 
contained in the Illustrative Master Plan subject to any refinements 
thereto arising from the completion of the planning and 
environmental review processes for the Project. 
 
4. No less than eighty (80) percent of the Project will be reserved as 
                                                
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY State 
Urban Development Corporation, 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 2006-11988). 
75 Angotti, supra note 19, at 175. 
76 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 9. 
77 Id. at 9-10 
78 Brief for Respondents, at 8-9, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY 
State Urban Development Corporation, 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 2006-11988). 
79 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 10. 
80 Brief for Respondents, supra note 79, at 10. 
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open space and will be dedicated as parkland that is subject to the 
protective provisions of State and City law pertaining to park 
properties. 
 
5. Upon completion of construction of the Project or phases thereof, 
the state-owned areas designated as open space under the General 
Project Plan shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of state parks and 
shall be afforded the protections of state law relating to the non-
alienation of state park lands.81 
 
In addition to these agreements above, the MOU created a new 
subsidiary of the Empire State Development Corporation called the 
Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation (“BBPDC”) that was 
responsible for implementing the project and creating a General Project 
Plan in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding and the 
Illustrative Master Plan.82 
The BBRDC completed the General Project Plan (“GPP”), but ignored 
many of the community efforts to put the Brooklyn Bridge Park into 
action.83 It eviscerated the original purpose of creating the Brooklyn Bridge 
Park—to prevent high-rise luxury apartment buildings that would obstruct 
views of the East River.84 In the GPP, two major developments were 
proposed on piers 1 and 6.85 On Pier 1 a hotel and residential development 
were proposed to replace two existing warehouses.86 Two buildings would 
be built, one 55 feet high and another 100 feet high.87 The second proposal 
on pier 6 called for either one residential building 315 feet high, or 
alternatively, two buildings 215 feet high.88 Additionally, an existing 
building on pier 6 would be transformed into another residential building of 
54 feet.89 Lastly, an existing manufacturing building would be converted to 
a residential building of 169 feet.90 All in all, the proposed GPP would 
create a hotel and either 4 or 5 residential buildings on land that was defined 
as a public park in the MOU.91 
This long history was the backdrop for a lawsuit decided in 2006 that is 
                                                
81 Memorandum of Understanding, Brooklyn Bridge Park Defense Fund v. NY State 
Urban Development Corp., 2006 WL 6589451 (N.Y.Sup. 2006) (No. 2006-14764). 
82 Brief for Respondent, supra note 79, at 10. 
83 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 75, at 12-13. 
84 Id. at 7. 
85 Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp., 14 Misc.3d 
515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 7-8. 
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fundamental to understanding the changing circumstances and limitations of 
the public trust doctrine.92 The court, in Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. New York State Urban Development Corp. found that 
the MOU between the City and State did not define the actual parameters of 
the parkland, but rather the GPP determined what was considered dedicated 
parkland.93 Additionally, the court interpreted the MOU to allow for 
approximately 80 percent of the park to be used as parkland, and the MOU 
to permit any use on the remaining 20 percent, regardless of what that use 
is.94 The court held that “[w]hile this doctrine continues unabated, beyond 
peradventure, the parcels designated for residential/commercial 
development herein are not parkland, have never been parkland and were 
never designated to become parkland. As such, they fall entirely outside the 
scope of our Public Trust Doctrine.”95 This holding allows for parks to be 
dedicated through an MOU and then for the GPP to determine which areas 
of the park are for parkland and which areas can be used for commercial 
and residential uses.96  
The MOU above clearly dedicates piers 1-5 as a public park.97 
However, the GPP placed a hotel and residential building in the park, which 
is a direct violation of the public trust doctrine.98 What is more concerning 
is the possibility that this holding would allow for unlimited commercial 
and residential development in public parks dedicated in MOUs.99 In its 
reply brief, the petitioners caution, “For this court to ignore this threat to the 
Public Trust Doctrine is to allow this case to be a precedent for unlimited 
commercial and industrial development in or adjacent to public parks,”100 
for example, placing residential apartments on the edges, entrances, and 
possibly within the park.101 The court disagreed with this argument, finding 
that the GPP redefined what is dedicated parkland, and that the planned 
                                                
92 Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp. 14 Misc. 3d 
515 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2006). 
93 Id. (interpreting the MOU to defer to the GPP when designating the area to be 
dedicated as parkland). 
94 Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund, 14 Misc. 3d at 523 (discussing the GPP proposal for 
approximately 90 percent of the project to remain open space, which is in agreement with 
the MOU). 
95 Id. at 524. 
96 Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund, 14 Misc. 3d at 523. 
97 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 10. 
98 See id. at 24-28 (arguing that the private development takes place “close” to the 
edges of the park and “within” the proposed park). 
99 See Rizzo, supra note 21, at 5. 
100 Reply Brief For Petitioners at 8, Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. N.Y. 
Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d 1029 (2008) (No. 20006-11988). 
101 Id. 
2015] THESE PARKS ARE OUR PARKS  
 
119
location of the residential and hotel buildings are not within parkland.102  
The analysis of the case was flawed. The MOU should not be permitted 
to act as a dedication device only to be thwarted by a GPP.103 The GPP 
should guide the planning, but those guidelines should be restricted by the 
original MOU.104 This case was affirmed by the Appellate Division 2nd 
Department,105 but never reached the Court of Appeals. In the event another 
private/public venture attempts to utilize a similar dedication model, the 
Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to strengthen the public trust 
doctrine and find that when a park is dedicated through an MOU the 
parameters of the parkland cannot be subsequently changed in the GPP, if 
they have already been specified. 
 
B. The Hudson River Park 
 
The Hudson River Park (“HRP”), more than anything, exemplifies the 
failure of private parks.106 The NY State Legislature adopted the Hudson 
River Park Act (“HRPA”) on September 8, 1998.107 The HRPA’s purpose 
was to effectuate a self-sustainable public park.108 This meant the 
employees, operations, and maintenance of the park were to be 
independently supported by income generated within the park.109 
Commercial tenants’ rent, fees from park-operated concession revenues, 
and independent grants and private donations were intended to secure 
sufficient income for the park’s operation.110  
The HRP was the first park that envisioned complete self-sustainability 
through commercial use, and many viewed the quasi-public/private 
partnership envisioned in the HRPA as the future of New York City 
parkland.111 The Senate’s statement in support of the act described the HRP 
                                                
102 Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp., 
50 A.D.3d 1029, 1031 (2d Dep’t 2008). 
103 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 8. 
104 Amicus Curiae Brief of Sierra Club at 5-6, Brooklyn Bridge Legal Defense Fund v. 
N.Y. Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d 1019 (2008) (No. 20006-11988), 2007 WL 
5232222 (arguing that the MOU agreed that the GPP was to be guided by the Illustrative 
Master Plan, which did not intend to allow “specialized” commercial uses). 
105 Brooklyn Legal Defense Fund v. NY State Urban Development Corp., 50 A.D.3d 
1029 (2d dep’t 2008), aff’g 14 Misc. 3d 515 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2006). 
106 Trouble in Parkland, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/09/opinion/opinionspecial/09CI_hudsonpark04.html. 
107 Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1642 (1998). 
108 Hudson River Park Trust, About Us, http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/about-us/hrpt 
(last visited March 3, 2015). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Ulam, supra note 71 (describing the HRP as the first park to be financed through 
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as “the most significant public space to be created in Manhattan since the 
creation of Central Park.”112  
The HRPA’s intention was clear, to develop a self-sustainable public 
park, with the interest of serving all New Yorkers: 
 
The planning and development of the Hudson River Park as 
a public park is a matter of state concern and in the interest 
of the people of the state. It will enhance the ability of New 
Yorkers to enjoy the Hudson river, one of the state’s great 
natural resources; protect the Hudson river, including its 
role as an aquatic habitat; promote health, safety and 
welfare of the people of the state; increase the quality of 
life in the adjoining community and the state as a whole; 
help alleviate the blighted, unhealthy, unsanitary and 
dangerous conditions that characterize much of the area; 
and boost tourism and stimulate the economy . . . . It is in 
the public interest to encourage park uses and allow limited 
park/commercial uses in the Hudson river park . . . . [It is 
intended that] the costs of the operation and maintenance of 
the park be paid by revenues generated within the Hudson 
river park and that those revenues be used only for park 
purposes.113  
 
There are two important features of this statement of intent. First, it 
makes it clear that the HRP is created as a public park and for the public.114 
Second, it suggests that the operation and maintenance of the park are to be 
paid through private commercial uses.115 Additionally, the HRPA created 
the “Hudson River Park Trust” (“the Trust”), a public benefit corporation to 
oversee the development plan, design, construction, and future operation 
and maintenance of the park.116  
As mentioned above, some of the park’s revenue has come through 
commercial use of the space.117 However, the planning and operation of the 
park have been remarkably underfunded.118 In 2005 the Park only generated 
                                                                                                                       
the model of complete reliance on the private sector). 
112 Senate Statement of Support, dated June 19, 1998, Bill Jacket, S.B. 7845, Ch. 592. 
113 Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1642 (McKinney 1998). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.; Press Release, Governor George Pataki, Governor Pataki Names Appointments 
To Hudson River Park Trust (Mar. 4, 1999). 
117 Hudson River Park Trust, HUDSON RIVER PARK, 
http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/about-us/hrpt (last visited May 15, 2014). 
118 Hudson River Park Trust, 2004 Annual Financing Plans – Capital Commitments by 
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approximately $47,646,270 in operating revenue (after depreciation and 
operating expenses were subtracted).119 In 2013, this number only slightly 
increased to $34,169, 250.120 The initial investment of approximately $200 
million was not enough to adequately complete the park, nor was the 
operating revenue enough to properly maintain the parks.121 By 2005 most 
of the initial investment was drained and the HRP only halfway finished.122 
Currently, thirty percent of the park remains uncompleted,123 and the Trust 
is estimated to have a $7-plus million deficit.124 These facts that point to the 
park’s lack of revenue, current deficit, and inability of the Trust to finish the 
park show how the park was underfinanced from the start, and the risks 
involved in a quasi-public/private structure.125  
The legislature recently amended the HRPA to encourage transfer of 
development rights (“TDR”)126 to generate more revenue.127 However, if 
the TRD program does not adequately finance the current and future 
operations of the park, a question remains as to how the park will be 
funded. The most likely response is longer leases, more commercial 
development, and possibly residential buildings.128 The HRPA identifies 
                                                                                                                       
Source, available at 
http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/assets/content/general/2004AnnualReport.pdf. 
119 HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST, FINANCIAL STATEMENT (2005),available 
at http://www.hudsonriverpark.org/assets/content/general/FinancialStatements2005.pdf. 
120 Id. 
121 Op-Ed, Trouble in Parkland, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/09/opinion/opinionspecial/09CI_hudsonpark04.html?_r=
0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
122 Id. 
123 Paula A. Ullman, Let’s embrace this key moment for Hudson River Park, THE 
VILLAGER, Nov. 14, 2013. 
124 Laura Kusisto, Hudson River Park Plan Is Questioned, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323848804578605843365387704. 
125 See Ulam, supra note 71. 
126 Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs allow a property owner to sell their 
development rights to other owners. This is generally allowed because the municipality 
wants to preserve areas in a specific way, but does not want the property owner to be 
financially burdened. Rizzo, supra note 21, at 6. 
127 See Lisa W. Foderaro, Law Says Hudson River Park Is Allowed to Sell Air Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013 (“Wednesday night, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo signed into law 
the bill that will let Hudson River Park…sell development rights in order to collect much-
needed revenue.”). 
128 In the past the Hudson River Park has made exceptions regarding longer leases. An 
exception was made for Chelsea Piers, and the lease for Pier 57 has been extended to allow 
for 49 years. Lincoln Anderson, With long lease at Pier 40, would Related re-emerge?, 
THE VILLAGER, June 2009, available at 
http://thevillager.com/villager_319/withlongerlease.html. Additionally, prior to its 
amendment to allow the sale of air rights, discussions arose allowing housing on Pier 40. In 
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and defines “permitted uses” to mean, “park use” and “park/commercial 
use”, and “prohibited uses”.129 Therefore, any “permitted use” has been 
approved by the legislature.130 Although the HRPA provides for a public 
hearing prior to any “proposed” significant action, it is unclear what action 
will receive public comments.131 Additionally, the definitions in the act do 
not take into consideration accessibility, meaning the Trust could 
potentially approve a festival or enter into a lease with a luxury restaurant 
without any public accountability.132 Alternatively, a public hearing prior to 
any Trust action would give all community members the option of 
expressing their views. 
The Trust is required to deliver its annual financing plan and any 
amendments to the general project plan to a number of local officials.133 An 
option that would likely yield a result that benefits the public good is to 
allow for a deliberative democracy process in the financing plan.134 A 
deliberative democracy structure would promote civic engagement and 
provide an opportunity for all community members to deliberate about 
future park services, allowing all sides to better understand what park uses 
benefit all.135  
 
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE AS 
IT PERTAINS TO PUBLIC PARKS IN NEW YORK 
 
This section examines the history of the public trust doctrine and its 
competing views. It will discuss the how the public trust doctrine’s 
definitions of park/non-park purposes have included analysis of public 
access to parks, but how the focus has shifted toward relying primarily on 
proper functions of parks. This section seeks to demonstrate the necessity of 
more emphasis on access to parks in the court’s analysis, especially in the 
midst of the changing structures of parks to a private/public model and their 
reliance on entrepreneurism on public space. 
 
                                                                                                                       
the News: A Possible Hudson River Park Solution, TRIBECA CITIZEN, June 20, 2013, 
available at http://tribecacitizen.com/2013/06/20/in-the-news-a-possible-hudson-river-
park-solution/. 
129 Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1643 (McKinney 1998). 
130 Id. 
131 Hudson River Park Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 1647 (McKinney 1998). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 53, at 756-58 (discussing the benefits of deliberative 
democracy). 
135 Id. 
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A.  Doctrinal History 
 
The origins of the public trust doctrine in the U.S. are grounded in 
preventing private ownership of property from disrupting the public 
interest.136 Under this doctrine, certain lands are held by the state in trust for 
the public’s interest.137 Generally, the justification behind this principle has 
been to “encourage and direct economic growth”, by allowing for the 
navigable waterways to remain under the ownership of the state in which it 
resides.138 Additionally, the public-trust doctrine has been a state’s issue, 
and therefore differs from state to state.139 Professor Joseph Sax in his 
influential article lays out three general limitations the doctrine has on state 
governmental authority: 1) the property must be used for the public purpose 
and available for use by the general public; 2) the property may not be sold; 
and 3) the property should be limited to traditional or related uses.140 This 
section will examine the public trust doctrine in New York as it pertains to 
parkland and how its analysis has concentrated mostly on preserving the 
latter two of Sax’s principles to the detriment of the first. 
In New York, the public trust doctrine includes protection of public 
parks from alienation and use for non-park purposes,141 reflecting the 
principle that state parkland is held by the state, in trust for the 
public.142 Any alienation of parkland or use for non-park purposes requires 
approval by the legislature.143 The policy behind requiring legislative 
approval for non-park use or alienation is that there is more public 
accountability in that process, which includes a “Home Rule Request” and 
the ULURP process.144  
                                                
136 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (discussing the origins of the concept of 
jus privatum and its subjugation to jus publicum: “though in point of property it may be a 
private man’s freehold, yet it is charged with a public interest of the people, which may not 
be prejudiced or damnified.”); Martin v. Wadell’s Lessee 41 U.S. 367, 383 (1842). 
137 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 13. 
138 Michael Seth Benn, Towards Environmental Entrepreneurship: Restoring The 
Public Trust Doctrine in New York, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 209 (2006) (quoting MOLLY 
SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920, at 11-12 (Harold Hyman & Stuart 
Bruchey eds.1987)). 
139 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 476-78 (1969) (discussing restrictions on state 
authority). 
140 Id. at 477. 
141 Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630 (2001). 
142 See id. 
143 Id. at 630-31. 
144 Gresham, supra note 34, at 284-85, 290-91. Prior to any legislative act that 
alienates parkland or allows for the non-park use of parkland a “home rule request” must 
be sent after approval by 2/3 of the local legislature. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 40. 
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This general rule is complex, and has been defined and redefined in over 
150 years of state court decisions.145 Additionally, the doctrine has been 
critiqued as inconsistent, lacking clear definitions or guidance for parks, and 
allowing for too much discretion and flexibility for judges in the 
determinations of when parkland should be protected by the doctrine.146 A 
look at the leading cases that have defined the doctrine offers an 
understanding of the doctrine’s benefits and limitations. 
The landmark Court of Appeals case from 1871, Brooklyn Park 
Commissioner v. Armstrong, initially articulated the public trust doctrine’s 
protections against alienation of parkland.147 In Armstrong, the city of 
Brooklyn acquired a large tract of land through eminent domain.148 In an 
action by the legislature in the act of 1861 the municipality was authorized 
to take lands for a public place, for public use, and for a public 
park.149 Additionally, upon the fulfillment of the act of 1861 the acquired 
lands were vested “forever in the city”.150 The act of 1861 authorized and 
issued bonds to raise the necessary funds for the land.151 In subsequent 
legislation, the act of 1870 sought to sell a parcel of the parkland to the 
defendant, who refused to take title, claiming, “the city had not the power to 
convey a clear title in fee, free from all encumbrances.” The case was 
commenced as a test case.152  
The court in Armstrong held that the land in question could not be sold, 
because of prior bond obligations and contracts with those 
bondholders.153 However, the case also provides the basis, in its discussion, 
for the public trust doctrine as it pertains to parkland.154 The court explained 
that dedicated parkland might only be sold through proper legislative 
                                                                                                                       
Prior to a change in land use, which includes the alienation of parkland or use for a non-
park purpose a ULURP application must be submitted to the City of New York Department 
of City Planning. The ULURP process includes direct recommendations from the 
community board after a public hearing. However, the recommendation from the 
community is not dispositive and cannot halt the process. Uniform Land Use Review 
Procedure § 2-01. Additionally, any actions to “approve, fund or directly undertake an 
action which may affect the environment are subject to review under the State 
Environmental Quality Review Act. Division of Environmental Permits New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation: The SEQR Handbook 12 (2010). 
145 Rizzo, supra note 21, at 3. 
146 See Gresham, supra note 34, at 276. 
147 The Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871). 
148 Id. at 235. 
149 Id. at 239. 
150 Id. at 241. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 238. 
153 Id. at 248. 
154 Id. at 243. 
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approval.155 The act of 1870 demonstrated proper legislative approval; 
however, the obligations to bondholders ultimately prevented the sale.156  
Fifty years later the Court of Appeals extended the public trust 
doctrine’s protections of parkland in Williams v. Gallatin, where it 
prohibited the use of parkland for a non-park purpose without legislative 
approval.157 In Williams, the New York City Park Commissioner entered 
into a ten-year lease with the Safety Institute of America (“The Institute”) 
for the use of the Arsenal Building located in Central Park.158 The Institute 
sought to provide studies and promote methods of safety and sanitation 
through its use of the property.159 The lease required that the Arsenal 
Building remain open to the public and free of charge five days of the 
week.160 However, it reserved two days a week when the building was 
closed to the public.161 Additionally, the lease prohibited commercial 
transactions for gainful purposes without any rent charges.162 The Institute 
agreed to make no less than $50,000 in repairs, alterations, and 
improvements to the Arsenal Building in exchange for its use.163 The 
plaintiff claimed that the construction and alteration of the Arsenal Building 
would damage and injure Central Park for the use and enjoyment of the 
New York City public.164  
The court held that the lease did not establish a park purpose, and 
therefore the Park’s Commissioner must seek legislative approval before the 
lease could be valid.165 The court’s discussion provides guidance on how 
park purposes “should be viewed”: 
 
A park is a pleasure ground set apart for recreation of the public, to 
promote its health and enjoyment. It need not, and should not, be a 
mere field or open space, but no objects, however worthy, such as 
courthouses and schoolhouses, which have no connection with park 
purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon it without 
legislative authority plainly conferred, even when the dedication to 
                                                
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 248. 
157 See Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920). 
158 Id. at 250. 
159 Id. at 251. 
160 Id. 
161 Williams v. Gallatin, 108 Misc. 187, 191 (Sup. Ct. NY. Cnty. 1919). 
162 Id. at 190. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 187. 
165 Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 254 (finding the purposes of the Safety Institute not related to 
the purposes of a park). 
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park purposes is made by the public itself and the strict construction 
for the private grant is not insisted upon.166  
 
Moreover, the court provided examples of what it defined as “pleasure 
grounds.” It includes, “[m]onuments and buildings of architectural 
pretension which attract the eye and divert the mind of the visitor, floral and 
horticultural displays, zoological gardens, playing grounds, and even 
restaurant and rest houses…”167 The court’s holding therefore turned on the 
mission of the Institute, and concluded that its mission—to promote the 
understanding of safety and sanitation—does not advance this court’s 
definition of park purposes as pleasure grounds.168  
The court’s decision has been influential in guiding future courts’ 
analyses of park and non-park purposes.169 Cyane Gresham in her 
article, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal Parkland in New 
York, criticizes the Williams’ court for its failure to provide an adequate 
guide for future courts, given its failure to clearly define what purposes are 
park or non-park.170 Gresham acknowledges that the Williams court lists 
specific examples of park purposes; her critique is that the court does not 
provide any concrete test or theoretical base for its distinctions between the 
park and non-park purposes.171 This critique is accurate. The lack of a test 
or theoretical base for future courts leaves too much discretion for judges to 
determine arbitrarily what a park’s purpose is.172  
A major problem with the definition provided by the Williams court is 
its failure to recognize how its definition would allow for park development 
without considering that a pleasure ground could easily exclude much of the 
public if the project was unaffordable.173 For example, under the Williams 
analysis, a museum, zoo, or restaurant that charged high entrance rates 
could be constructed in a public park, which would fit the definition of a 
“pleasure ground”, but prevent access to much of the public, because it 
could be unaffordable.174 The result would be a public park that charges an 
                                                
166 Id. at 253. 
167 Id. at 253-54. 
168 Id. at 254. 
169 Gresham, supra note 34, at 276. 
170 Id. at 275. 
171 Id. at 276. 
172 See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 191 (finding the 
test for non-park use is “substantial satisfactions” to the general public); SFX 
Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 555, 555 (1st. Dep’t 2002) (finding a 
revocable license terminable at will cannot be a non-park purpose); Friends of Van 
Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.S.2d 623, 631 (finding a non-park purpose 
because of a 5-year long construction that inhibited use). 
173 See Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 254. 
174 Id. 
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entrance fee. Unfortunately, this type of analysis has guided courts after 
Williams. Alternatively, this case could be analyzed as a violation of the 
public trust doctrine because the Institute’s lease with the Park’s 
Commission would have excluded the public from use of the Arsenal 
Building two days a week and at nights.175 While the court did not explicitly 
mention the exclusion in its analysis, it did include relevant allegations from 
the petitioner’s complaint, including that the lease would hinder the 
beneficial use by the public.176 
Almost 45 years later the Court of Appeals again analyzed the public 
trust doctrine in the context of parkland, and like in Williams it 
concentrated its analysis on the type of facility being used for park 
purposes.177 In 795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, the Court of 
Appeals held that a café-restaurant in the southeast corner of central park 
was a valid exercise of the Park Commissioner’s discretionary power under 
section 51 of the General Municipal Law.178 In 1959, the entrepreneur 
Huntington Hartford and Robert Moses began talks about constructing a 
“café operation”(“the café”) in Central Park.179 Mr. Huntington 
subsequently donated a sufficient amount of money to construct the café in 
the park.180 In 1960 the Commissioner of Parks formally accepted the 
gift.181 The plaintiff brought an action claiming that this sort of structure in 
the park was contrary to park purposes, alleging that the café operation 
would replace 22,000 square feet of parkland with a two-story rectangular 
glass building.182 He claimed that the structure would remove foot paths, 
park benches, trees, and pave over existing lawn.183 Lastly, he claimed that 
the restaurant would not be able to serve lower-income patrons who could 
not afford to eat there.184 
The County Supreme Court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
that the claims were not proved at trial, and in fact the cafe would improve 
                                                
175 Id. at 251. 
176 Id. 
177 795 Fifth Ave. Corp v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 225 (“Thus the case 
comes down to the choice of location and type of facility.”). 
178 Id. (finding that section 51 of the General Municipal Law gives the Park’s 
Commissioner broad discretion in managing public parkland and judicial interference 
should only be imposed when “a total lack of power” is demonstrated); New York City, 
N.Y., Charter, 21 Department of Parks and Recreation § 553 (2013). 
179 795 Fifth Ave. Corp, 15 N.Y. 2d at 224 (Robert Moses was the Park’s 
Commissioner at the time and Huntington Hartford was a wealthy New Yorker). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 795 Park Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 40 Misc.2d 183, 184 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1963). 
183 Id. at 184-85. 
184 Id. at 185. 
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park enjoyment, because the operation called for new footpaths, replaced 
benches, and provided lighting for bridges and ponds.185 The court 
explained, “[the] transformation of parklands from their natural state to 
other park uses…does not involve a violation of park purposes. It merely 
involves a change from one proper park use to another.”186 In its discussion 
of non-park use, the court articulates a “test”, which asks whether the 
proposed development “offers substantial satisfaction to the public.”187 
The court further explained that when certain structures are placed in a 
park they provide a different and glorified aspect to that structure and 
therefore “offer substantial satisfaction to the public.”]189. 795 Park Ave., 
40 Misc.2d at 191.] For example, people may attend a production in a 
traditional theater, but to see the same production in an open-air park theater 
has its own benefits and provides satisfaction to the public.188 Likewise, a 
restaurant inside a park provides a special atmosphere that “offers 
substantial satisfaction” to the public.189 Although inserting structures in a 
park can provide further enjoyment of the park, the court failed to consider 
significantly whether the entire public could enjoy these structures if they 
severely limit the accessibility of public parkland.190 The court failed to 
adequately address the plaintiff’s claim that the café would be unaffordable 
to many and assumed without justification that any user would be able to 
receive the “substantial satisfaction” offered from a café in the park.191 This 
begs the question of whose definition of substantial enjoyment the court 
should consider. 
Further, the logic used by the court to assess “substantial satisfaction” 
makes little sense,192 under which, anything short of a government building 
placed in a park will have an added benefit. A luxury apartment placed in a 
public park will also provide substantial satisfaction to certain members of 
the public, like a high-end restaurant, or a theater that charges substantial 
rates to attend.193 Although, the court in 795 Fifth Ave, provides a more 
                                                
185 Id. at 187, aff’d 795 Park Ave. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d at 225 (1965). 
186 Id. at 190. 
187 Id. at 191. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, it did not address 
whether the “substantial enjoyment” test articulated is a proper or improper test to be used. 
The Court of Appeals seemed to assume that a restaurant is a park purposes. See 795 Fifth 
Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 225-26 (1965). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 192 (describing testimony that from the architect of the pavilion that the 
restaurant kitchen could be used for any class of people). 
191 Id. (dismissing this complaint as speculative and advising to bring this complaint 
when the violation is “actual”). 
192 Id. at 191. 
193 This Comment does not argue that an amphitheater that remains free or affordable, 
or a restaurant that remains affordable should not be placed in a park. Rather it suggests 
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concrete test for future courts to follow, courts must consider more 
searchingly whether these developments offer “substantial” enjoyment to 
all, without limiting lower-income people’s access.194 
More recently, the court has applied the public trust doctrine in two 
important cases, Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York and 
SFX Entertainment v. City of New York. In Friends of Van Cortlandt Park 
the Court of Appeals held that the construction of a water treatment plant 
under Central Park, which would deprive the public of use of the area for 
five years, required legislative approval.195 Here the court’s analysis turned 
on the temporal deprivation of the parkland.196 The court found that the 
finished project would not impede the public’s use of the park, but the 
construction that would take at least 5 years to complete was a non-park 
purpose and therefore required legislative approval.197 Here, the court’s 
holding focused on access, and could be expanded by future courts to apply 
to limitations on access based on the inability of some to afford the services. 
The New York County Supreme Court in SFX Entertainment was the 
first to comprehensively incorporate the affordability of the project into its 
analysis, when it found that an amphitheater, which was not accessible to 
the public and charged a $30 admission fee, did not serve a park purpose.198 
However, the First Department overturned the County Supreme Court’s 
ruling on this issue, and found that because the project was issued through a 
license instead of a lease it did not violate the public trust 
doctrine.199Although the First Department did not agree with the lower 
court’s conclusion and put a greater emphasis on the contractual 
arrangements, it did not completely overturn the lower court’s analysis.200 
The First Department affirmed the lower court in so far as it was 
permissible to open up the proposal process, and concentrated its analysis of 
the public trust doctrine primarily on the contractual arrangements.201 This 
leaves the court’s factorization of inaccessibility based on income a proper 
                                                                                                                       
that the court should analyze whether a project would have the effect to excluding or 
limiting lower-income folks from use of the park, instead of dismissing the argument as 
unripe for judicial review. 
194 795 Park Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 191. 
195 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 631-32. 
196 Id. at 631. 
197 Id. at 631-32. 
198 SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 50226(U), slip op. at 9 
(N.Y.S.2d June 13, 2002). 
199 SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 555, 555 (1st Dep’t 
2002) (holding that the concession agreement was inconsistent with the original proposal 
and therefore appropriate to open the proposal process). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 556. 
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factor for future courts to use.202 
The important take away from these recent cases is that the courts are 
acknowledging that income restrictions and accessibility should be part of 
the analysis when determining valid park purposes and non-park 
purposes.203 To conclude, the history of the public trust doctrine provides a 
few major themes. First, it is clear that when parks are dedicated to the 
municipality they remain in trust for the public purpose.204 Second, the park 
cannot be alienated or used for a non-park purpose without approval of the 
legislature.205 Third, the court’s analysis of park use and non-park use looks 
at whether the proposed use furthers the recreational aspect of the park,206 
whether it “offers substantial enjoyment”207, and whether temporally the 
park would substantially prohibit the public’s use.208 Fourth, only one 
overturned County Supreme Court articulated substantial interference with 
park accessibility by reason of limiting use based on inaccessibility because 
of income.209 For parks to remain protected and for the benefit of the public, 
the court should follow the approach of the County Supreme Court in SFX 
and provide an income means-sensitive analysis to determine if the purpose 
actually serves the public.210 
 
B.  Competing Views of Public Trust Doctrine 
 
Commentators differ on the efficiency of the public trust doctrine. As 
noted, Gresham argues that the doctrine is insufficient because it lacks clear 
definitions of what is and is not a park use.211 Gresham explains, “[the 
courts’ definition of park uses] do not address the existing range of 
contractual activities in parks. They have been ignored, creating bad 
precedent and preexisting conflicting uses. Finally, they do not adequately 
define what is and is not a park”.212 She critiques New York courts for 
relying too heavily on the definition of park articulated in Williams, 
claiming that park uses adapt and change over time and therefore the parks 
                                                
202 Id. 
203 See SFX Entertainment, Inc., 2002 Sup. Ct. WL 1363372 at *8. 
204 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 631. 
205 Id. at 632. 
206 Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920). 
207 795 Park Ave. v. City of New York, 40 Misc.2d 183, 191. 
208 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 632. 
209 SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 50226(U), slip op. at 9 
(N.Y.S.2d June 13, 2002). 
210 Id. 
211 Gresham, supra note 34, at 276. 
212 Gresham, supra note 34, at 282-83. 
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must, too.213 Gresham suggests that the common law doctrine could provide 
more support if its definitions were more clearly stated and suggests that the 
legislature could easily flesh out such definitions.214 
Gresham does not discuss whether the courts should use income level 
when analyzing non-park use, but she is clearly concerned with the move 
towards privatization of parks.215 Gresham’s analysis assumes trust in the 
state legislature to articulate guidelines that strengthen the common law 
doctrine, which it very well may be able to.216 However, the state legislator 
representing a region outside of the city may be too removed from the 
concerns of municipal politics. The courts have more flexibility to consider 
the circumstances of each specific case, and any legislation strengthening 
the definitions of park/non-park purpose should be accompanied by a 
modification by courts to look at accessibility of parkland through the lens 
of an income means sensitive analysis. 
Michael Seth Benn’s Note, Towards Environmental Entrepreneurship: 
Restoring The Public Trust Doctrine in New York, argues for a reversion of 
the public trust doctrine to the public use doctrine articulated in eminent 
domain cases such as Morris and Kelo v. City of New London,217 theorizing 
that this articulation would allow for free market environmentalism.218 Benn 
also views the non-park/park use distinction as insufficient, because it lacks 
clear definitions.219 However, Benn’s analysis seeks to formulate a clearer 
definition in the form of, simply, whether the use would benefit the public 
as formulated in Morris and Kelo.220 This definition would allow for more 
entrepreneurship in the park, and would reject the park use/non park use 
dichotomy, because it bars consideration of the best-valued use of the 
                                                
213 Id. at 294 (“If New York courts are relying on Williams v. Gallatin as a definition 
of park purposes, then only one view of park purposes is being used as a basis for 
consideration.”). 
214 Id. at 317 (suggesting that state statutes could flesh out definitions and that the Rule 
of the City of New York already list prohibited activities, were definitions about park/non-
use could easily be added). 
215 Id. at 314 (posing the question “are parks still democratic spaces if wealthy citizens 
have nice parks and poor citizens do not?”). 
216 See id. at 316. 
217 Yonkers v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 482 (finding that economic development in an 
underdeveloped area constituted a public purpose); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 478-79 (holding that economic development was a proper public use under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause). 
218 Benn, supra note 134, at 226-27 (free market environmentalism theorizes that the 
free market is better equipped to protect the environment than governmental regulation 
because the environment is an asset that the free market will protect). 
219 See id. at 203-04. 
220 See id. at 229-30. 
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parkland.221 
Benn’s analysis does not adequately consider the purpose of the public 
trust doctrine, which is to limit private control of space for the public’s 
interest.222 The public trust doctrine was originally established for the 
purpose of preventing private owners from inhibiting the public’s use.223 
The public trust doctrine is about the government exerting its police power 
to preserve land for specific purposes, however, this is different than its 
power to take “private property for public use.”224 Additionally, under Kelo, 
“economic development” is a permitted public use for a takings, however, 
entrepreneurship in parks can severely limit the public’s enjoyment of the 
park, which is a fundamental principle of the public trust doctrine.225 
Instead, the non-park/park use distinction should be defined more clearly 
along the lines of keeping parks accessible to the entire public. 
Lastly, in his practice report, Five Innovative Idea for Funding Parks 
and Open Space, Christopher Rizzo, a practitioner with Carter Ledyard & 
Milburn LLP, articulates the crisis facing public parks and provides advice 
for moving toward more privatization of parks.226 Rizzo explains that parks 
can employ different models, dedications, and functions to promote 
commercial use in public parks.227 Rizzo’s analysis provides guidance to 
these parks so that they remain well funded, and is not intended to focus on 
the public’s access to parkland.228 He views commercial use and 
private/public partnerships as the most effective way to maintain parks, and 
argues that the better maintained the park, the better it is for the public.229 
However, Rizzo does not take into consideration the fact that commercial 
use risks limiting access to the parks on the basis of income and resources, 
because private/public partnerships typically need to use parkland to raise 
money for park maintenance, which entails hiring personnel, and other 
necessary capital improvements to fit their idea of a park.230 
The analysis developed in this Comment is most compatible with 
Gresham’s approach. The public trust doctrine does not provide adequate 
                                                
221 Id. at 228 (arguing that a Taking Clause “public use” definition will promote 
entrepreneurship in public parks, creating a more financial support and environmentalism). 
222 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). 
223 Id. 
224 Sax, supra note 140, at 479 (discussing the problems with formulating the public 
trust doctrine around the takings clause).  
225 See id. at 476-78. 
226 Rizzo, supra note 21, at 1. 
227 Id. at 8-10. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. at 8. 
230 See Swan, supra note 25 (discussing how a private restaurant in Union Square 
would charge high prices and take away from the historic use of the park as a place for 
community and political speeches). 
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protections to the public enjoyment and access to parkland, nor does it 
provide adequate definitions so that courts can effectively limit the use of 
parkland from non-park uses.231 This comment adds to Gresham’s analysis 
that the test needs to include more attention to keeping parkland accessible 
to the public, irrespective of means or income levels, and more 
accountability to local politics in order to effectively provide these 
protections. The following section will provide suggestions for maintaining 
parks as open and accessible to all, including how the public trust doctrine 
can better serve as a protection for all to enjoy public parks. 
 
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT OUR PARKS 
 
The first step to creating equity of parks access is to increase the Parks 
Department’s budgets.232 Although the budget has increased over the past 
few years with the 2013 fiscal year targeted increase at approximately 28 
million,233 and advocates viewed the funding year 2015 preliminary budget 
with optimism,234 the Parks Department is still inadequately funded.235 A 
larger budget allows parks to make necessary improvements and properly 
maintain parks, without relying on private funding or entrepreneurship in 
parks.236 Parks can therefore plan for and permit amenities that are 
accessible to all, because its focus can be on providing its services without 
concerns about funding.237 
In addition, the Court of Appeals must set a well-defined test for 
                                                
231 See Gresham, supra note 34, at 316, 317. 
232 Tupper Thomas, Op-Ed., Park Equity Begins with a Better Public Budget, GOTHAM 
GAZETTE (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/opinions/4970-park-
equity-new-york-budget-tupper-thomas. 
233 Press Release, New Yorkers for Parks, New Yorkers for Parks Commends City 
Council, Mayor for Increases to Parks Department Budget (July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ny4p.org/advocacy/advocacypdf/budget062912.pdf. 
234 FY15 Preliminary Budget: Hearing Before the New York City Council Committee 
on Parks and Recreation (Mar. 27, 2014) (testimony of Tupper Thomas, Executive 
Director, New Yorkers for Parks), available at 
http://www.ny4p.org/advocacy/Prelim%20budget%20march%2027.pdf (“the mayor’s 
preliminary budget for Parks not only baselines many of the important restorations made 
over the past few years, but funds items up front that are usually subject to the annuals 
budget dance.”). 
235 Equity in Parks: Hearing Before the New York City Council Committee on Parks 
and Recreation (Apr. 23, 2014) (testimony of Daniel Squadron, New York State Senator), 
available at 
http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/Squadron%20Parks%20testimony%2004.23.14%20(1).
pdf. 
236 See Press Release, supra note 235. 
237 See id. (discussing the benefits that come from increased governmental funding to 
parks). 
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determining park/non-park purposes that incorporates general accessibility 
of the public into its analysis of the public trust doctrine.238 This Comment 
suggests a two-part test that is aligned with New York’s precedent. First, 
courts should consider, as they have been, whether the proposed 
development functions for the typical uses appropriate for that park.239 
Under this step, the court should look at where the park is located, what 
prior functions the park has served, and should also consider the multiple 
and expanding functions of parks beyond the “pleasure ground” function 
articulated in Williams.240 Second, the court should turn to whether the use 
will provide substantial benefits to all New Yorkers’ use of the park.241 
Under this part, the court should take a hard look at any proposed 
agreement between the state and private venture to assure that the proposed 
benefit will be accessible to all.242 This analysis should look at entrance fees 
and times of operation for the entire public.243 Additionally, this analysis 
should consider whether the park is adequately separated from residential 
apartment buildings, because when residential apartment buildings are not 
separated from parkland the park essentially becomes a “backyard” of sorts 
for the residents, thereby excluding the public.244 The Court’s analysis must 
also consider a new test in light of the expanding privatization of public 
space, and the methods used to subvert the public trust doctrine.245 For 
example, the court should not permit a General Project Plan to disregard the 
original agreement.246 
Further, there must be more deliberate democracy included in the 
decision making process for park purposes.247 When a court concludes that 
a venture is considered a non-park purpose, an arduous process is in place, 
requiring a “home rule request”, and triggering the ULURP and SEQRA 
processes.248 The ULURP protections are not required when a park purpose 
                                                
238 See supra text accompanying notes 131-65. 
239 See Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 253 (discussing parks as a pleasure ground); 
Kusisto, supra note 125 (discussing the principles of the public trust doctrine). 
240 Gresham, supra note 34 at 294-297 (discussing the different park uses, such as its 
use as a “rural pastoral landscape,” a “center for active recreation,” a “social and political 
commons,” and a “nature conservation.”); see Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. at 253. 
241 See Sax, supra note 140, at 476; see also SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 2002 WL 1363372 at *9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2002). 
242 See generally 795 Park Ave., 40 Misc. 2d at 192 (discussing whether the restaurant 
would only provide luxury food and drink services). 
243 See supra text and accompanying notes 50-65. 
244 See supra text and accompanying notes 79-92. 
245 See supra text and accompanying notes 50-65. 
246 See supra text and accompanying notes 79-92. 
247 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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is present,249 and the SEQRA process may or may not be required.250 
Therefore, situations such as GoogaMooga can take place without any 
accountability to the community surrounding the park.251 A process of 
deliberative democracy would allow for community members to deliberate 
on whether a festival, or other venture where a revocable license is used, 
would be something that they want in their park.252 Additionally, this type 
of process would allow Park officials to explain and potentially justify the 
necessity of having the proposed venture, thereby eliminating community 
backlash afterwards. For example, there are some small projects that have 
sought to create public spaces outside of the marketplace and have been 
showcased in Spontaneous Interventions: Design Actions for the Common 
Good.253 
This Comment will conclude by making the connection to another 
major issue facing parks today – the disparity of parks in affluent 
neighborhoods compared to lower-income neighborhoods.254 The decrease 
in the Parks Budget and the rise of conservancies and privatized models has 
allowed parks in affluent neighborhoods to flourish and parks in lower-
income neighborhoods to deteriorate.255 The privatization of our parks has 
contributed to this in two major ways. First, a privatized model, such as a 
conservancy, allows for affluent areas to concentrate their wealth on 
preserving the parks in their “backyards” without accounting for any 
broader municipal structure.256 For example, Logan Paulson has been 
scrutinized for his $100 million donation to Central Park in 2012.257 The 
Conservancy model has worked for parks in affluent neighborhoods, but 
when a neighborhood does not have ultra-wealthy individuals to donate for 
                                                
249 Contra Uniform Land Use Review Procedure NY Code § 197-c (1990), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ap/step5_rules.shtml. 
250 Contra State Environmental Quality Review § 617 (2000) (depending on the park 
purpose activity it may be required to SEQRA if it has a significant impact on the 
Environment). 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 1-22. 
252 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
253 Ulam, supra note 71. 
254 Testimony of Daniel Squadron, supra note 237. 
255 Id. 
256 See David J. Kennedy, Restraining the Power of Business Improvement Districts: 
The Case of The Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 307 (1996) 
(arguing that BIDs will decrease wealthy individuals’ willingness to tolerate other taxes 
and that if we allow communities to fund their own neighborhoods then the broader 
municipal picture may become ignored). 
257 Felix Simon, Philanthropic Donation of the Day, John Paulson Edition, REUTERS, 
Oct. 23, 2012, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/10/23/philanthropic-
donation-of-the-day-john-paulson-edition/ (criticizing philanthropy as a way for the 
wealthy to donate to services that support them, when tax payers have the burden of paying 
for much of the donation because of charitable deductions). 
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the maintenance of its parks then it suffers. 
Second, parks in lower-income neighborhoods rely more on extravagant 
development projects than ones in wealthier neighborhoods.258 For 
example, a new megamall has recently been approved in Flushing Meadow 
Park followed by a lawsuit claiming it violates the public trust doctrine.259 
The best way to relieve these problems is with more public funding to 
the Parks Department. A better-funded Park Department would eliminate 
the “necessity” of privately funded parks and the issues that ensue. Daniel 
Squadron, in his recently proposed bill has attempted to alleviate this 
inequality by distributing 20 percent of private donations to parks in 
affluent areas to parks in lower-income areas.260 This bill is a step in the 
right direction and assists in promoting the well-being of parks in lower-
income neighborhoods. The bill, however is still a part of the city’s 
increased reliance on social charity and does not solve the underlying 
problems that come with the privatization of parks, such as limiting access 
and disparities between parks in affluent neighborhoods and lower-income 
ones.261 
 
* * * 
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